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With respect to development assistance, for instance, Canadians remain supportive, but many express worries that aid may make poor countries "too dependent" and prefer aid programs that assure "a clear benefit to Canada." together very well. As they emphasized the Canadian tradition of internationalism, most observers tended to overlook differences, and focused instead on a more or less coherent vision of the country's role in world politics that most citizens would share. The problem, as Don Munton and Tom Keating explain in a recent article on the question, is that "internationalism divides Canadians as well as binds them." 4 While there is a strong consensus on an active involvement in foreign affairs and on economic internationalism, important divergences remain regarding the country's relationships with the United States, development assistance and security issues. With respect to foreign aid and the arms race, for instance, Munton and Keating speak of "marked disagreement" and "even some polarization of views." 5 Unfortunately,
we know little about these divisions and about their impact on policy. One may suspect that they are rooted in domestic politics, but the study of this link has been left largely unexplored. 6 This paper uses the case of public support for foreign aid to probe further the nature of Canadian internationalism. Along with peacekeeping, development assistance has been a pillar of the Pearsonian internationalism that, for a long time, has defined Canada's external relations. 7 This aspect of Canadian foreign policy, however, has generated contrasted views among the public. Strongly supported in principle, development assistance has not been endorsed without reserves and in a universal way by Canadians. Canadians are divided over internationalism. First, they are divided in the sense that they seem to be of two minds, and hold ambivalent views about foreign aid. While most citizens agree that development assistance is important, their support often remains shallow, unmatched by a commitment to undertake concrete actions. Second, the attitudes Canadians hold toward development assistance Ibid., p. 545. 6 Ibid., p. 540. indicate that there is a clear division in the country's public between liberal and conservative internationalists, a cleavage that is anchored in domestic ideological and partisan differences. This division is similar to the American ideological cleavage described by Eugene Wittkopf and Ole Holsti, and is also compatible with a host of comparative findings on public support for foreign aid. 8 In many ways comparable to the attitudes found in other countries, the internationalism of Canadians does not appear as vigorous and as consensual as is often suggested.
The paper begins with a presentation of the evolution of Canadian development assistance policy, to underline the contrast between an official discourse that has remained generous and financial commitments that have declined significantly over the years. The second section surveys public support for foreign aid in Canada, to see how it compares to the situation in other donor countries, how it has evolved over time, and how it relates to public attitudes about other domestic and international policies. This section confirms the image of a supportive but ambiguous citizenry. The third section explains this apparent ambivalence by the existence of not one but two publics for development assistance: a favorable public, with liberal or leftist political and ideological orientations, and a more reluctant public, with conservative preferences and ideas. Because Canada is a prosperous middle power with no colonial past, aid has sometimes been presented as a "Canadian vocation."
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For the past few years, however, this perception has had at best a remote relationship with reality. In this area as in many others, Canada has increasingly taken on the appearance of a "fading power." 13 Originally, as was the case elsewhere in the developed world, Canadian foreign aid arose in response to a broad spectrum of needs and social forces.
14 It should first be recalled that aid was invented at the beginning of the Cold War more as a tool in the struggle against communism than as an instrument to fight poverty. Before anything else, Canada's development assistance policy thus served to strengthen the geo-strategic Beyond this objective, shared by all advanced capitalist countries, foreign aid could also facilitate the promotion of specifically Canadian interests.
Development assistance came to be seen, in particular, as an effective means to rectify the almost total absence of relations between Canada and the Third World, and to affirm the country's foreign policy autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. Canadian aid was also clearly shaped by the evolution of the country's political values and institutions, especially those related to the development of the welfare state. In many respects, Canadian aid policy can be understood as an outward projection of the principles underlying domestic social policies.
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Cranford Pratt aptly summarized this defining tension between interests and principles when he described Canadian aid policy as consistently torn between the two competing rationales of "international realism" and "humane internationalism." Canada does continue to stand out for the originality of its policies in certain spheres, such as the active collaboration with non-governmental organizations, the promotion of gender equality, and the protection of the environment. It should also be stressed that development assistance has begun to benefit from the country's improved fiscal situation. In 2002, Prime
Minister Jean Chrétien announced a long-term commitment to increase aid resources by 8% a year. 23 The same year, the focus on Africa during the G8 Summit in Kananaskis led the government to create the Canada Fund for Africa, with a budget of $500 million over three years. 24 Overall, however, in spite of these recent initiatives and of a sophisticated discourse emphasizing poverty reduction and the need to promote the developing countries' ownership of aid programs, Canada is no longer the leader it once was in matters of development assistance.
The Canadian government has generally proposed that citizens were aware of the country's financial situation and supported the changes made to aid policy. Yet this interpretation -suggesting that Canadians have likely become less "humane" and more "realist" than in the past -has rarely been the object of empirical verification. This is the purpose of the next section.
The Canadian Public and Foreign Aid: Supportive But Not Very Attentive
The few analyses that have been conducted on Canadian public attitudes toward development assistance tend to reinforce the idea that, in this the basic conflicts that shape Canadian politics, both in its domestic and foreign affairs dimensions, are reflected in public attitudes towards aid. When we pay attention to these conflicts, we obtain a more nuanced, less monolithic view of the Canadian public. Before we introduce these distinctions, however, we must first revisit the Canadian consensus.
Overall, the Canadian public does appear highly supportive of foreign that it is important for their country to pursue the promotion of assistance to poorer countries, while only 11.2% think that this foreign policy objective is not important (12.4% are neutral).
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53% of the respondents also agree that Canada should give more aid to developing countries, while only 26% disagree (21% are neutral). 29 The fact that public support for more generous levels of foreign aid is lower than the support for the very principle of development assistance is to be expected, since the commitment evoked in the budget increase question is more explicit and important. The gap between these two questions, however, indicates that the Canadian consensus over foreign aid is weaker and more fragile than what is often suggested. It is telling that only a small majority (53%) favor increased budgets, even though the previous decade was marked by a drastic reduction of the country's aid effort. 28 The exact question is: "I am going to read you a list of goals Canada has for its foreign policy and for each I'd like you to tell me how important you think it is for Canada to pursue that goal, using a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means not important at all and 10 means very important. 5) Promoting assistance to poorer countries." 29 The exact question is: "I am going to read you a list of statements about Canada's foreign policy and I would like you to tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of these statements. Please respond using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly disagree and 10 means you strongly agree. 12) Canada should give more foreign assistance to developing countries." This limited support for what, in fact, would be a movement back toward Canada's traditional policies, may in part be explained by the public's lack of information on the issue. In Canada and elsewhere, most studies converge to suggest that public opinion on development assistance is "often misinformed and based on exaggerated perceptions of the size of aid budgets, or weak understanding of development co-operation." 30 On average, Canadians think that 10.5% of the federal budget is devoted to aid; only 20% know that, in fact, it amounts to less than 2%. 31 When told of the actual size of the aid budget, respondents tend to become more supportive of higher expenditures. In an Environics poll presented to the Canadian International Development Agency in October 1998, the percentage of persons who considered that the country's aid budget was not sufficient increased from 24% to 44% when respondents were informed of the real amount of money that the federal government spent on development assistance. 32 These results suggest that public support for increased aid budget would probably be higher if Canadians were better informed about the cutbacks of recent years.
In a cross-national perspective, Canadian support for foreign aid is about average, and the country stands very much as the quintessential "middle" power. As can be seen in Table 1 
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For Canada, the exact question is presented in footnote 28. For the United States, the question is: "On the whole, do you favour or oppose our giving economic aid to other nations?" For Europe, the question is : "In your opinion, it is very important, important, not very important, or not at all Even when the budgetary context is less difficult, domestic programs tend to have the priority. Canadians are supportive of foreign aid, but they simply do not rank it very high among their different concerns. As can be seen in Table 2 , in 2000, only 41 % of Canadians thought world poverty should be a priority for the federal government (20 % made it a high priority), and even less (36%) said the same for the quality of life in poor countries (a high priority for 14% of respondents). These international development objectives ranked well below a series of domestic priorities, including many that were not even within the jurisdictions of the federal government. The main public concerns had to do with health care (a priority for 85% of respondents), Canadian poverty (80%), crime (76%), the national debt (74%), personal taxes (71%), rising tuition fees (69%), greenhouse gas emissions (66%), and early childhood development (64%). Among issues that were given a low priority, only Canadian arts (71% of respondents made it a low priority) ranked behind important to help people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop." quality of life in poor countries (63%) and world poverty (57%). Public support for foreign aid, it has been said, tends to be "a mile wide and an inch deep." 40 The contrast between the high support expressed by Canadians and the relatively low importance they give to the issue seems in line with this assessment. The fact that Canadians give more importance to domestic issues than to the reduction of world poverty is not surprising. This is indeed the situation that prevails in most donor countries, and it probably reflects the common view that "charity begins at home." In Canada, however, the gap between the public's preoccupation with world poverty and its concerns for domestic issues, including poverty in Canada, appears particularly wide. In this respect, Canadians' attitudes seem close to those that prevail in some European countries that are less supportive of foreign aid, and more preoccupied by domestic inequalities (Austria, Belgium, France). 
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When comparing foreign aid with other foreign policy priorities, we also see the limits of public support for "humane internationalism." Table 3 presents 15 foreign policy goals that Canadians were asked to assess in the 2001 Ipsos-Reid survey. Assisting poor countries was the policy priority that elicited the least "very important" assessments (27%). The issue ranked near the bottom of the list of "important" or "very important" objectives, with 76% of respondents saying it was important, a rate similar to that obtained for 42 The exact question is: "Thinking just of the federal government, on a 7-point scale where 1 means lowest priority, 4 means middle priority, and 7 means highest priority, how much priority would you like the government to put on [list topics]?" reducing illegal immigration (75%), promoting Canadian culture (76%), or improving Canada-US relations (77%), but quite below protecting Canada's natural resources (97%), preventing the spread of infectious diseases (95%), protecting the environment (95%), preventing international terrorism (90%), and promoting trade opportunities (89%). At the very least, this order of preferences suggests that aid is no more than one of many Canada's vocations. As the next section shows, the tensions identified here may well be a reflection of political conflicts within the Canadian public rather than of mere incoherence.
Two Publics?
The Left, the Right, and Development Assistance Development assistance is a political issue, anchored in a country's domestic politics. As a form of income redistribution, it raises all the core questions that divide the left and the right in liberal democracies, questions that have to do with human development, freedom, equality and the role of individual and collective actions. The rhetoric of the left about aid typically evokes social justice, solidarity and public commitments, whereas discourses on the right refer instead to dependency, inefficiency, and waste. In countries where social-democratic parties have been powerful and where they have built a generous and universal welfare state, foreign aid tends to be at a high level. 45 Where conservatives have dominated, domestic inequalities remain more important and they tend to prevail in the public's mind, over international development issues. 46 Not surprisingly, individuals and groups on the left tend to be more favorable to international redistribution, whereas people and social forces on the right are generally more skeptical and reluctant. The relationship between ideological/partisan orientations and support for foreign aid, however, has rarely been tested rigorously. In fact, the question was seldom raised, because practitioners and scholars seemed more interested in establishing the contours of the Canadian consensus than in exploring the political divisions that underpin public opinion on foreign policy. As a consequence, polls on foreign policy issues rarely asked questions about domestic issues or partisan preferences, whereas more conventional political surveys left most foreign policy issues aside. To study this relationship between domestic and foreign policy attitudes, we will use The exact question is: " Aid to developing countries: should the federal government spend more, less, or about the same as now?" The other issues raised randomly in the list are: defence, welfare, pensions and Old Age Security, health care, unemployment insurance, and education. level of education, personal income, gender, region, language, and religiosity.
The first column indicates the expected direction of the relationship, on the basis of the literature on public opinion and foreign aid. with those of Lumsdaine, who has probed extensively the ideological foundations of support for foreign aid, and with our own comparative work, which associated support for foreign aid with domestic political orientations. 
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Note:
The results are Pearson correlation coefficients. Significance levels (two-tailed): *<.05 **<.01 ***<.001.
The Canadian Election Study being an extensive survey of political attitudes, we also have the possibility of going one step further, to see how support for increased foreign aid budgets relates to a host of other ideological orientations, which can be seen as dimensions of the broader left-right debate. The relationship between confidence in government and support for increased foreign aid budgets must therefore be interpreted with prudence. A low level of confidence cannot simply be read as a conservative view.
The last two items in the political beliefs column, support for increased defence spending and support for peacekeeping, are both positively and significantly related to support for increased aid budgets. These relationships, however, cannot be understood simply as expressions of the left-right debate.
They probably capture other dimensions of support for internationalism, such as a preference for an "activist" foreign policy. 56 The same could be said of should see for themselves, and dislike minorities tend to disapprove development assistance. Behind the familiar portrait of a public committed to "humane internationalism," we find a more fragile consensus, defined by an awkward combination of generous principles and guarded commitments, and a divided public, which disagrees on foreign aid, just as it does on most issues of political relevance. These divisions are in part social, cultural and regional:
a young educated woman from Quebec is more likely to support development assistance than an older, less educated but wealthier man from outside
Quebec. First and foremost, however, these are political divisions. The ideological and partisan correlates of support for foreign make perfect sense 57
Ibid.
as the multi-faceted expression of the opposition between the left and the right in Canada.
Conclusion
In the 1990s, the Canadian government dramatically reduced its foreign aid effort, to end up becoming one of the least generous donor countries of the OECD. All the while, Canada maintained a relatively progressive, even innovative, rhetoric on development assistance, without recognizing the widening gap between this discourse and the country's actual contributions.
To some extent, the Canadian public shared this ambiguity, as it gave a strong approval to development assistance in principle but appeared reluctant to accept increases in aid budgets, despite the successive rounds of cutbacks of the 1990s. In this sense, Canadians were divided, of two minds, over internationalism. They were also divided in a more fundamental and political way, between two publics, one on the left more favorable to foreign aid, and How important, one may ask, is public opinion on such questions?
Many international relations scholars and practitioners assume the public is ignorant and relatively indifferent about foreign policy. It is true, as we have seen, that foreign aid does not rank very high among the preoccupations of Canadians, and issues that have low political salience are unlikely to be shaped strongly by public attitudes and perceptions.
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The fact that there is little direct link between public opinion and a country's foreign aid is indeed a relatively solid, and to many disappointing, finding of comparative scholarship on the question. 
